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COMMENTARY
LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: WHOSE RIGHTS
ARE THESE, ANYWAY?
Richard Michael Fischl *
While I was working as an attorney for the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, I once had to call an employer who had just fired his
lawyer for losing his case before the agency. I needed to find out who
would be representing him in the enforcement proceedings that would
follow. The moment I reached him, I tried to give him his Miranda
warnings ("I'm from the government, and I'm not here to help you"),
but he was not going to pass up the opportunity to give me an earful,
now that he had his oppressor on the phone. The Board had ordered
him to reinstate an employee whom he had discharged for union or-
ganizing, and he strenuously objected that this was an illegitimate in-
terference with his right to run his business the way he wanted. "If
that's not unconstitutional," he said of the Board's decision, "I don't
know what is. And I'm going to take this case to the court of appeals;
I'll take it to the Supreme Court; why, I'll even take it to Sixty Min-
utes, if I have to."
In the circumstances, I was not surprised that this fellow thought
that Sixty Minutes was a higher authority than the Supreme Court.
But I did find it striking at the time that he put his objection to the
Board's conduct in terms of the Constitution. Labor lawyers-espe-
cially Labor Board lawyers-tend to focus almost exclusively upon
statutory and evidentiary issues; apart from an occasional due process
claim, we are seldom required to confront the Constitution. (To most
government lawyers, in any event, a due process claim is the last ref-
uge of the guilty-as-hell.)
But the employer's ingenuous remark reminded me of a long-
standing tradition in American culture: recall de Tocqueville's famous
dictum that all political controversies eventually reassert themselves
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. An earlier version of this pa-
per was presented in December 1987 as part of the University of Miami School of Law Faculty
Lecture Series, Bicentennial Reflections on the Constitution. Many thanks to Craig Becker,
Ken Casebeer, Mary Coombs, Pat Gudridge, Dennis Lynch, Jeremy Paul, and Alan Swan, and
especially to Richard Hyland, Jim Pope, and Steve Winter, for their thoughtful comments, and
to Ana Gloria Rivas-Vazquez for her able research assistance.
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as constitutional ones. You might call this the "Romance of Ameri-
can Constitutionalism." It is a romance to which Ameri-
cans educated in the 1950s and 1960s are particularly given. For de
Tocqueville's dictum was perhaps never truer than during the Warren
Court era, when we were taking high school civics and United States
History at the very same time that the Supreme Court was on a binge
for social justice. To be sure, the 1960s came to an end a long time
ago, but the romance remains very real. I suspect that many of us still
instinctively react to every social injustice we see by secretly thinking,
"that must be unconstitutional." And we still cheer loudly inside
every time the Supreme Court vindicates that intuition, and wince or
weep when it doesn't.
Today, it seems that even crusty labor lawyers are beginning to
succumb to this constitutional romanticism. Indeed, here we are in
the 1980s, with union membership at an all time low,1 and cynicism
about the current efficacy of the National Labor Relations Act at an
all time high.2 Taft-Hartley and fifty years of judicial erosion were
bad enough;3 until very recently, anyway, the Labor Board seemed
poised to finish off altogether what little was left of that noble docu-
ment.4 In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that it has become
something of a trend to cast a longing look to the Constitution as a
basis for improving the legal lot of labor. Specifically, the hope seems
to be to ground labor's right to picket, protest, and otherwise carry on
its struggles with management within the protective ambit of the first
amendment.
Each year, many of my labor students are startled when they
learn that the first amendment does not already protect labor in this
way. Of course it does to a certain extent: picketing and other protest
activities enjoy at least some constitutional protection against govern-
ment interference. But the rub is that your employer can fire you for
engaging in the same conduct, and the first amendment will not do
anything about that. This is the result of the so-called "state-action"
I See Union Membership Failed to Keep Up with Employment Growth in 1987, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 15, at B-1 (Jan. 25,. 1988) (reporting Census Bureau statistic that union
membership has dropped to 17% of wage and salary workforce over the age of 16).
2 See, e.g., Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 871 (1987); Weiler,
Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 1769 (1983).
3 See J. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (1983).
4 See, e.g., Finkin, Labor Law by Boz-A Theory of Meyers Industries, Inc., Sears, Roe-
buck and Co., and Bird Engineering, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 155 (1985).
5 For a perceptive critique of the limits current jurisprudence places on such protection,
see Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
1071, 1082-96 (1987).
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doctrine, which holds in essence that various constitutional guaran-
tees, such as those under the first amendment, apply to actions of the
state, but not to the private sector.6 Since most employers are private
actors, their actions are not governed by the Constitution at all.
Thus, private sector employers are perfectly free to restrict their em-
ployees' protest activities, unless their actions independently violate
some statutory or common law norm.
Accordingly, we have begun to see a crop of thoughtful articles
searching for ways to circumvent the state-action doctrine in the labor
area. Clyde Summers, perhaps the most humane voice in American
labor law scholarship, gently reminds us that the ideals embodied in
the Constitution may be achieved by means other than constitutional
adjudication; he therefore urges the courts to "give predominate
weight to constitutional values" in interpreting congressional stat-
utes-including the National Labor Relations Act-that do reach pri-
vate sector labor relations.7 And in a wonderfully insightful and
ambitious piece, James Gray Pope urges a theory of "labor liberty,"
attempting an end-run around the state-action problem through the
use of the thirteenth amendment, which prohibits the institution of
slavery and thus by its terms reaches private actors.8
I greatly admire these articles and the trend they represent, and I
wish the authors every success in their endeavors. But I hold little
hope for this turn to the Constitution; I think it may well represent an
instance of something looking far better from a distance than it does
up close. Indeed, before we labor lawyers attempt to find a panacea in
the Constitution, we would do well to see how it is working in con-
texts where it already applies. I will explore two such contexts here.
The first is the case of public employers, such as fire and police de-
partments and public schools. These are literally state actors, and
they are therefore constrained by the first amendment in their deal-
ings with their employees, even under current doctrine.' A second
context is private employers who are themselves clothed with first
amendment protection-for instance the press and the church.10 The
burden of my argument is this: When the rights available to employ-
ees working in these two contexts are fully explored, I am afraid we
6 See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law ch. 18, at 1688-720 (2d ed. 1988).
7 Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy:
Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 689, 696.
8 Pope, supra note 5, at 1096-112. For a similar argument, see Kupferberg, Political
Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 Va. L. Rev. 685, 728-46 (1985).
9 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
10 U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom.., of the press .... ).
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may be forced to conclude that labor is like Miami-the rules are
different here. For when constitutional norms confront the underly-
ing cultural and political assumptions of American labor relations, the
constitutional norms almost invariably give way.
I. EMPLOYERS GOVERNED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A.
I start with the case of the public sector employer, who, as noted
above, is already constrained by the first amendment."1 I want to be-
gin the analysis by contrasting the stories of three hypothetical citi-
zens, so that we can better see how the public employee labor case
fares under the general rubric of first amendment law. In each of our
three hypotheticals, the citizen calls into question the actions of a
public official-the local district attorney ("DA")-and does so by
means of a questionnaire that she circulates to the DA's staff. For
these actions, she is punished by the state. But there the similarities
end.
Citizen A belongs to a citizens' action group, People for Better
Government, which vigorously advocates its view that government
employees should be evaluated and rewarded on the basis of merit
rather than political service. Upon hearing from a disgruntled assis-
tant DA ("ADA") that attorneys in the office are being pressured to
work for officially supported political candidates, she circulates a
questionnaire to the ADA's in an attempt to ascertain the extent of
this practice. For distributing this questionnaire, Citizen A is prose-
cuted by the state under a statute prohibiting criticism of public offi-
cials; she is convicted and given a prison term or fine for the violation.
Can there be any doubt that this would constitute an outrageous vio-
lation of the first amendment?1 2
Citizen B is a retired person who spends most of her free time as
an amateur court watcher. She befriends various court personnel and
many lawyers, and thus is in on much of the courthouse gossip. She
becomes particularly close to an ADA, who expresses much dissatis-
faction with the DA's handling of internal office affairs. In particular,
I I By at least one scholar's reckoning, nearly a fifth of our working population is now
employed by public sector employers. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the
Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 3, 6 (1987).
12 It would not, of course, be necessary to reach the constitutional question if we were to
conclude that the questionnaire at issue was not a "criticism" of the DA, but rather a mere
solicitation of the opinions of the ADA's. Let us assume for purposes of the analysis presented
in the text, however, that "[q]uestions, no less than forcefully stated opinions and facts, carry
messages . . . " Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983), and can thus constitute the
conduct prohibited by the statute in question.
[Vol. 10:729
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he complains about the quality of supervision for ADA's, the lack of
any grievance-resolution mechanism for the staff, and the practice of
subjecting ADA's to involuntary transfers between the various divi-
sions in the criminal court. Sympathetic with her friend, Citizen B
circulates a questionnaire attempting to determine the views of the
rest of the ADA's with respect to these practices and their effect on
office morale generally. Like our "Better Government Advocate,"
our "Amateur Court Watcher" is prosecuted under the statute
prohibiting criticism of public officials. Once again, there is no doubt
that such a prosecution would violate the first amendment.
Let us move on to the case of Citizen C. She too circulates a
questionnaire among the DA's staff. But Citizen C is not just a citi-
zen; she is, in addition, an employee of the DA. She is also a real
person: Sheila Myers, until October 1980 an ADA in the New Orle-
ans DA's office. 3 While still employed by that office, Myers was ad-
vised by her superiors that she would be transferred from one to
another division of the local criminal court. She resisted, in part be-
cause she was concerned that the transfer would create a conflict of
interest by forcing her to prosecute individuals on probation with
whom she had previously worked in a counseling program. Moved by
the refusal of her superiors to reconsider the transfer, but concerned
as well about a number of other issues affecting ADA's in the office,
she circulated a questionnaire that addressed both the various internal
office affairs issues raised by our Amateur Court Watcher and the
nonpartisan professionalism issue raised by our Better Government
Advocate.I4 The DA, upon hearing from one of his supervising attor-
13 The facts that follow are taken from Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41 & n.l. See Myers v.
Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D. La. 1981).
14 The questionnaire contained the following questions:
1. How long have you been in the Office?
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?
3. Were the transfers as they [a]ffected you discussed with you by any superior
prior to the notice of them being posted?
4. Do you think[,] as a matter of policy, they should have been?
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding transfers has
been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it [a]ffects overall working performance of A.D.A.
personnel?
8. If so, how do you think it [a]ffects office morale?
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through
rumor?
10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word of [the supervisors
in the DA's office]?




neys that Myers was thus fomenting a "mini-insurrection" in the of-
fice, fired her for "insubordination."
Does the first amendment prohibit the government from punish-
ing Myers for circulating her questionnaire, as it prevented the gov-
ernment from punishing Citizens A and B?15 In Connick v. Myers, 6
the Supreme Court answered that question with a resounding "it de-
pends." According to Connick, the first amendment does protect
Myers as a citizen: she would clearly be immune from criminal or civil
prosecution for circulating the offending questionnaire. 17 But the pro-
tection from government punishment afforded her in her status as an
employee-that is, with respect to the prospect of discharge or other
workplace discipline-is different. According to the Court, it depends
upon whether the speech at issue can be characterized as ad-
dressing an issue of "public concern," or merely a matter of "personal
interest."
To the extent that Myers "speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of per-
sonal interest," she has no constitutional remedy against retaliatory
discipline at the hands of her governmental employer." Thus, the
Court reasoned, "[w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly consid-
ered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in
the name of the First Amendment."19 Conversely, if her speech does
"touch upon a matter of public concern," she may be entitled to pro-
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition to the
office structure?
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have.
461 U.S. at 155-56 (appendix to Court's opinion).
1s It might be objected that the "punishment" to which Myers was subjected-discharge
from her job-differs in kind from the prison term or fine imposed upon our Better Govern-
ment Advocate and Amateur Court Watcher. Discharge, however, is "the industrial world's
'capital punishment,' " see Pope, supra note 5, at 1108, and it is hardly clear that its effect
upon an individual would be any less devastating than the penal alternatives. See id. at 1007-
08 & nn. 232-35. Indeed, modern constitutional law has for the most part recognized that fact.
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-45 (describing historical development of first amendment protec-
tion in public employment); Massaro, supra note 11, at 8-17 (same). In any event, the point of
this essay is that "labor is different," and our initial instinct that employee discipline is some-
how not "punishment"-at least not in a "legal" sense-is itself a striking illustration of this
phenomenon.
16 461 U.S. 138.
17 Id. at 147.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 146.
[Vol. 10:729
1989] LABOR AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
tection 2°--but only if her first amendment interests are not "bal-
anced" away under a test first articulated by the Court in Pickering v.
Board of Education.21 Under Pickering, the question of protection vel
non is analyzed by striking "a balance between the interest of [the
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-
cern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 22
How do these typologies apply to the facts of Myers's case? The
Connick Court found that the transfer policy and the other "internal
office affairs" issues addressed in her questionnaire were designed to
"gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her super-
iors," and were thus merely "matters of personal interest."23 Accord-
ingly, the Court determined that Myers had no constitutional remedy
against government retaliation in this respect.24 The Court conceded
that the "non-partisan professionalism" issue did, by contrast, "touch
upon a matter of public concern. ' 25 But it concluded that the Picker-
ing balancing test deprived Myers of first amendment protection with
respect to this aspect of her questionnaire as well. Thus, the Court
found that the DA's interests "as an employer" in punishing "disrup-
tive" employee conduct predominated over Myers's interests "as a cit-
izen" in expressing her views.26 Of particular significance to the
Court was the fact that Myers's speech took place "at the office,"
rather than elsewhere, and that it "followed upon the heels" of "an
20 Id. at 149.
21 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
22 Id. at 568, quoted in Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
23 461 U.S. at 148-49. The Court's cynical characterization of Myers's motivation should
not go unremarked. The facts recounted in the Court's opinion suggest that she was moved by
a public-spirited consideration as well: her concern that her recent transfer would create a
conflict of interest in performing her professional duties as a public prosecutor. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-14. Perhaps the Court has become so accustomed to requiring self-
interest as a prerequisite to legal protection for employee protests that it can no longer see
beyond this motive in evaluating human action. See Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutu-
alism and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 1989).
24 461 U.S. at 148-49.
25 Id. at 149 (citations omitted):
We have recently noted that official pressure upon employees to work for political
candidates not of the worker's own choice constitutes a coercion of belief in viola-
tion of fundamental constitutional rights.... In addition, there is a demonstrated
interest in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious
performance rather than political service .... Given this history, we believe it
apparent that the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to
work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the community upon which it
is essential that public employees be able to speak out freely without fear of retalia-
tory dismissal.
26 Id. at 150-54.
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employment dispute concerning the very application of th[e transfer]
policy to the speaker," and thus "threatened the authority" of her
superiors to run the DA's office.27
All of this, of course, comes in striking contrast to the first
amendment's treatment of our Better Government Advocate and our
Amateur Court Watcher. In the first place, it makes no difference to
the question of constitutional protection for them whether their
speech can be characterized as relating to a matter of "public con-
cern." Thus, it may well be the case that our Amateur Court
Watcher-in circulating the questionnaire addressing the various "in-
ternal office affairs" issues-might seem to us to be nothing more than
an officious intermeddler, motivated solely by her "personal interest"
in the welfare of her friend in the DA's office. But surely we would
not conclude that the government could therefore punish her for
speaking her piece. As the Supreme Court has often reminded us,
"[g]reat secular causes, with small ones"-the political as well as the
picky-are equally guarded against government repression.28 Nor
would we permit the judiciary to balance away the first amendment
rights of our Better Government Advocate-whose "nonpartisan pro-
fessionalism" questionnaire would admittedly "touch on a matter of
public concern"-on the ground that her speech might "disrup[t]"
the DA's office. The invocation of such a governmental interest as a
justification for punishing the speaker would rightly be met with a
derisive judicial cackle. 29 For engaging in essentially the same con-
duct as Sheila Myers, then, Citizens A and B would receive the full
protection of the first amendment. Yet, under Connick, Myers can be
punished without remedy, simply because she is an employee.
B.
If Connick thus seems a little odd as a piece of first amendment
doctrine, perhaps we can understand it as labor law. To begin, take
the purported distinction between matters of "public concern" and
issues of "personal interest." At first blush, this would appear to be a
somewhat difficult distinction for the courts to make. On the facts of
Connick, for example, it is not at all clear that the DA's handling of
"internal office affairs" is less a matter affecting the public interest
than the "nonpartisan professionalism" issue, since the way the DA
"runs his office" may have a substantial effect upon the nature and
quality of service to the public that he provides. Indeed, as the dissent
27 Id. at 153.
28 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
29 See L. Tribe, supra note 6, § 12-12, at 861-72.
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in Connick points out, "[ilt is hornbook law... that speech about 'the
manner in which government is operated or should be operated' is an
essential part of the communications necessary for self-governance the
protection of which was a central purpose of the First Amend-
ment."3 And, as most decisions respecting "the manner in which
government is operated" will to some extent affect those who are
called upon to do the "operating," such matters will almost invariably
have both a "public concern" and a "personal interest" component.3'
It is therefore not surprising that there is some confusion evident
in the case law in this area. Protesting race discrimination, to cite one
example, has been held to be a matter of "public concern," whereas
protesting sexual harassment has not.32 Nevertheless, my sense is that
the courts have begun to develop a coherent approach to these essen-
tially overlapping categories. In a nutshell, they are reading Con-
nick-plausibly, I think-to provide a de facto labor exemption from
first amendment protection. "Matters of personal interest" means is-
sues that involve the employment relationship between government
and public employee. The more it seems that the employee protest
relates to such a topic, the more likely it is that protection for the
speech will be denied; and this will be the case even though the protest
may also arguably "touch on a matter of public concern.
33
This labor exclusion seems to operate even when the courts are
forced to conclude that public employee speech does relate to "a mat-
ter of public concern." Recall that the Court in Connick agreed that
the "nonpartisan professionalism" component of Myers's question-
naire fell within this category, but nevertheless held the speech to be
unprotected under the Pickering balance. The Court's analysis here is
revealing: It saw as highly significant the fact that Myers spoke out
30 461 U.S. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)).
31 Accord Terrell v. University of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986)
("almost anything that occurs within a public agency could be of concern to the public" (em-
phasis in original)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987).
32 Compare Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (race dis-
crimination) and Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49 n.8 (explaining Givhan on these grounds) with
Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987) (sexual harassment). See generally Mas-
saro, supra note 11, at 20 n.95, 27-28 (collecting cases with similarly inconsistent results).
Callaway is surely attributable as well to a judicial insensitivity to claims of gender discrimina-
tion. Cf. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (pregnancy discrimination is not
gender discrimination).
33 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8 (suggesting that first amendment protection is available
only "where an employee speaks out as a citizen on a matter of general concern, not tied to a
personal employment dispute" (emphasis added)). To the same effect, see Terrell, 792 F.2d at
1362; Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986); Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d
1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985); Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1984).
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"at the office" and that the resulting discord with her superiors arose
not out of a conflict between citizen and public official over the direc-
tion of public policy, but "from an employment dispute concerning the
very application of that policy to the speaker."34 This application of
the Pickering balance thus seems simply to reproduce the substantive
effect of Connick's "public concern/personal interest" distinction by
rendering unprotected speech the content of which is too clearly
"public" to be plausibly characterized as an issue of "personal con-
cern," but whose deployment arises out of an employment dispute
and in an employment context, rather than in the setting of a more
disinterested conflict over public policy.
So why this labor exclusion, if a labor exclusion it is? The Court
offered two rationales for its holdings in Connick. First, the Court
worried that providing a constitutional remedy for "personal interest"
speech "would mean that virtually every remark-and certainly every
criticism directed at a public official-would plant the seed of a con-
stitutional case."35 Second, the Court was concerned that even
"public interest" speech might unduly "disrup[t]" the work of public
officials.36 We might, however, ask ourselves how convincing we find
such arguments in this context. With respect to the first concern-
that protecting "personal interest" speech would open the floodgates
of litigation-it is fair to ask whether Connick's "public concern/per-
sonal interest" distinction (especially given the substantial overlap be-
tween the supposedly dichotomous categories) and Pickering's case-
by-case ad hoc balance will make this situation better or worse.
Moreover, we do not seem to mind protecting "every remark" made
by nonemployee citizens respecting the acts of public officials; again,
the law is clear that the first amendment extends to all matters great
and small. Yet despite that protection, citizen speech cases do not
flood our courts, though I have noticed no shortage of protests. There
is a reason for that: Citizens by and large do not get punished for the
things they say about public officials, and we would think it outra-
geous if the government tried to do so. It is therefore not so much the
decision to extend first amendment protection to public employee
grievances that might raise a "floodgates" concern. Rather, it is that
public employers punish their employees for their speech; that is what
makes a "federal case" out of a "mere" personnel matter.
Similarly, the Court's concern with the prospect of office "dis-
ruption" is not entirely convincing: Our Amateur Court Watcher and
34 461 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 149.
36 Id. at 151-54.
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Better Government Advocate could, with impunity, circulate the
same questionnaires as Sheila Myers, suggesting that it is not "disrup-
tion" that is problematic. Indeed, apparently Sheila Myers would
herself have enjoyed constitutional protection had she gone public
with her concerns-surely a more disruptive course-rather than ex-
pressing them privately in the office.37
My sense is that the key to understanding the Court's decision
lies instead in its frank assertion that "the First Amendment does not
require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee com-
plaints over internal office affairs."3" Of course, the first amendment
does require that government be run "as a roundtable" for citizen
complaints about its modes of operation; "the censorial power is in
the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the
people."' 39 Why was the Court so quick to reject that metaphor for
the government in relation to its employees? Perhaps because the
term "roundtable" expresses an image of equal partners engaged in
self-governance, an apparently unthinkable concept in an employment
relation./0
Recall too the language of the Pickering balancing test: "The
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 41
Notice that the only interests thought to be implicated on the em-
ployee's side of the balance are those she has "as a citizen"; she is free
to participate in politics-in the discourse of collective self-govern-
ance-without constraint. But she is thought to have no recognizable
interest in participating in self-governance discourse as an employee.
By its very terms, the Pickering balance suggests that only the state
has a legally protected interest in the employment aspect of the gov-
ernment/public employee relationship.
It is in this light that we can also begin to make sense out of the
otherwise seemingly anomalous holding in Connick that the govern-
ment's interest in repressing Myers's speech was increased because
37 See id. at 148, 153 (suggesting that Myers would be protected if she had "s[ought] to
inform the public" of her concerns respecting internal office affairs); see also Massaro, supra
note 11, at 22-23 & nn. 100-01 (collecting cases to same effect).
38 461 U.S. at 149.
39 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (quoting 4 Annals of Cong.
934 (1794) (statement of James Madison)).
40 On the power of metaphor in legal thought generally, see Winter, Transcendental Non-
sense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 1989).
41 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added).
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Myers spoke "at the office," rather than taking her dispute to the pub-
lic. The point seems to be that it is not the government's interest "in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs" that mat-
ters, for surely that interest would have been threatened even more-
if we are to believe that it was threatened at all-had Myers gone
public. Rather, the government interest that is protected against "dis-
ruption" is its control over the employment relationship; that, I take
it, is the reason for Connick's emphasis on "the authority of the em-
ployer to run the office."'42 In sum, then, when the employee "does
politics," she can be viewed as a citizen legitimately involved in col-
lective self-governance, and the government cannot silence her
through the use of her vulnerability as an employee. But when the
citizen speaks out about work, we view her as a mere employee, and
she ceases to have any self-governance interest at all.
C.
From a labor lawyer's perspective, what is perhaps most fascinat-
ing about Connick, at first blush anyway, is that the case seems to
turn the labor law of the private sector on its head. Thus, while public
employees enjoy constitutional protection against employer retalia-
tion for their "public/political" but not their "personal/employment"
protests, note that the situation for private sector employees is virtu-
ally the reverse: Under the National Labor Relations Act, they enjoy
statutory protection for their protests on employment issues,43 but are
denied the coverage of the Act for purely political protests.'
But if we take a closer look, the two doctrinal areas seem to
spring from a common commitment to the same set of images: the
separation of our economic life from the political, of the private from
the public. Thus, we enjoy our public life as citizens of the state, and
our right to participate in political discourse is guaranteed by the first
amendment. But this is not a right belonging to us as employees, for
private sector employment law denies it altogether, and public sector
42 Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-53. °
43 See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (protecting right of em-
ployees to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid or protection").
44 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 663, 666 (1975) (no protection under Labor
Act for newsletter containing "wholly political propaganda" concerning federal election cam-
paign); see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-68 & n.18 (1978) (approving Ford
Motor). For a perceptive and critical account of this body of doctrine, see Hyde, Economic
Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(1981).
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law grants it not to employees as employees, but only to employees as
citizens.
In the end, however, my principal point is that labor is differ-
ent-that it seems to enjoy a special exemption from the constitu-
tional protection available to other citizens because of assumptions we
share about what it means to be an employee.45 My fear is that it will
thus be hard to locate in this jurisprudence much hope for labor's
emancipation.46
II. EMPLOYERS PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Let us turn to the private sector and look at a second context in
which the first amendment already applies-private institutions
clothed with first amendment protection, most notably the press and
the church. Of course, the first amendment applies in a different way
here than it does in the public sector employment context: not to con-
strain the conduct of the employing institution, but to protect these
institutions themselves against governmental intrusion. At the same
time, the National Labor Relations Act gives private sector employees
two related rights: the right to organize a union free from employer
retaliation, and the right to bargain collectively over terms and condi-
tions of employment.47 What happens when employees attempt to
assert their Labor Act rights against their employer, but the boss hap-
45 Ironically, the Court has recently adopted a similar exemption for expressive activities
by high school students; it thus now appears to be literally the case that the decision in Con-
nick treats employees as if they were children. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108
S. Ct. 562, 569-71 (1988).
46 Arguments to the contrary frequently focus upon NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982), and, more recently, Edward DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988). To be sure, those cases do represent a
salutary trend in constitutional doctrine toward extending to boycott activities the same first
amendment protections that are afforded other forms of protest. See Claiborne Hardware, 458
U.S. at 888-89, 907-15 (extending first amendment protection to boycott of white merchants by
black citizens and civil rights organizations protesting local civil rights policies); DeBartolo,
108 S. Ct. at 1394-95, 1397 (avoiding "serious [first amendment] questions" by interpreting
Labor Act provision prohibiting secondary boycotts narrowly, so as not to reach union's
peaceful distribution of handbills in shopping mall asking customers to boycott mall shops
until mall owner agreed not to hire construction contractors who paid substandard wages).
Such cases do not, however, seem to me to reflect a departure from the phenomena described
in the text, for they involve the use of the first amendment to prevent what is generally under-
stood to be governmental-not employer-interference with protest activities. Indeed, the
opinion in each case goes out of its way to characterize the protest at issue in traditional "state
vs. citizen over issues of public concern" terms. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913-14;
DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1398.
47 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1),
158(a)(3) (protection for right to organize); id. §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
158(a)(1), 158 (a)(5), 158(d) (protection for right to bargain collectively).
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pens to be the church or the press, and thus protected by the first
amendment against governmental interference with its mission?
Once again, let us begin with a couple of stories. Employee A is
a lay teacher in a parochial school, and she and her fellow teachers
decide to unionize. The bishop refuses to recognize or bargain with
their union, contending that the application of the Labor Act would
raise serious first amendment questions. In the Catholic Bishop case,4"
the Supreme Court sustained the bishop's position. The Court
seemed to be worried, in particular, about two situations that might
arise if it construed the Labor Act to cover parochial schools. The
first was the prospect of having to adjudicate a so-called mixed-motive
discharge or discipline case. Assume that our lay teacher were, in the
course of a single working day, to pass out union cards to her col-
leagues and to advocate to her students the use of birth control in
developing countries. Assume further that the bishop were to fire her
at the end of that day. There can be no doubt what the respective
positions of the parties would be before the Labor Board: the teacher
would claim that she was fired for union organizing (which would, of
course, be protected under the Labor Act),49 and the bishop would
contend that she was fired for controverting church doctrine on birth
control (which, conversely, would not).50 The Board's decision as-
sessing the bona fides of the bishop's religion-based explanation for his
conduct might, the Court feared, "impinge on rights guaranteed by
the Religion Clauses." 51 Moreover, the "very process of inquiry" into
the bishop's motives would raise first amendment entanglement
concerns.
52
The second problematic situation to the Court was that the very
bargaining obligation at issue might itself raise first amendment ques-
tions. For, although the employer's duty to bargain is limited under
the Labor Act to "terms and conditions of employment, ' 53 the Court
expressed the concern that "nearly everything that goes on in the
schools affects teachers, and therefore is arguably a 'condition of em-
ployment.' ,,54 Under such a construction of the bargaining obliga-
48 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
49 See supra note 47.
50 See National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (permitting discharge of
employee "for cause" unrelated to activity protected by the Labor Act).
51 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
52 Id. On the burdens of proof for mixed-motive cases under the Labor Act, see NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
53 National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (requiring employers and un-
ions to "confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment").
54 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 503 (citation omitted).
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tion, the bishop might thus be required to bargain over the scope and
direction of a parochial school's religious educational mission-a
prospect, in the Court's view, that would be inconsistent with the first
amendment. Accordingly, the Court decided that the Labor Board
had no jurisdiction to compel the bishop to bargain with the lay
teachers' union. 5
Employee B is a columnist for a newspaper, the Passaic Daily
News, and he and his fellow reporters also attempt to unionize. In
retaliation, his publisher decides that he will no longer run Employee
B's column. The columnist brings unfair labor practice charges, and
the Labor Board holds that the publisher unlawfully pulled the col-
umn in retaliation for the columnist's union activities. 6 In the typical
discrimination case under the Labor Act, the remedy for a prevailing
victim of discrimination is the restoration of the status quo ante, 57 but
that policy presents an unusual problem in the context of this case.
Thus, if the columnist had been fired, the Board would have ordered
his reinstatement; but since it was his column that had in effect been
"fired," the Board ordered it reinstated.58 On review in the District of
Columbia Circuit, the court of appeals upheld the Board's findings
that the publisher had acted for anti-union reasons and that its con-
duct was therefore a violation of the Labor Act. 59 But the court also
concluded that the first amendment barred any order forcing the pub-
lisher to reinstate the column, citing Miami Herald v. Tornillo I for
the proposition that the government may not "compe[l] [the press] to
publish that which it chose to withhold."61
What is the point of the stories of Employees A and B? I have no
quarrel with the general proposition that the government should not
be allowed to dictate what ought to be taught in the parochial schools,
or what ought to be printed by the press. But my question here is
this: Why are the first amendment rights involved in these cases un-
derstood to belong only to the employer, and not to the employees?
That is, in the Catholic Bishop case, why do we worry about the
bishop's first amendment freedom, and not the teacher's right to ex-
press her views with respect to religious doctrine? And in Passaic
Daily News, why is it that the publisher's first amendment interests
are protected, and the columnist's right to publish his column ig-
55 Id. at 502-04.
56 Passaic Daily News, 266 N.L.R.B. 898 (1983).
57 See National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
58 266 N.L.R.B. at 906.
59 Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1551-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
60 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
61 736 F.2d at 1557.
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nored? In each case, the employer is permitted to punish his em-
ployee for what would otherwise constitute pro-union activity
protected by the Labor Act, and in each case this is held to be permis-
sible because of-rather than in spite of-the first amendment.
As it turns out, the key question in determining whose speech or
religion interests will receive first amendment protection is not, under
current jurisprudence, really a question of constitutional law at all;
rather, it is a question of who owns the employing enterprise. Thus,
we protect the publisher (but not the columnist) because it is "his"
press, and the bishop (but not the teacher) because it is "his" school.
And these "his's" come not from the first amendment, but rather
from the distribution of entitlements between employer and employee
in the labor contract at common law. Under this distribution, the
publisher and the bishop own the enterprise and, accordingly, are
treated as "citizens," entitled to enjoy the first amendment right
against the state. The employee's relationship to the enterprise is, by
contrast, limited to the wage she gets in return for her work-
an interest insufficient, apparently, to trigger any constitutional
protection.62
Once again, then, we see the importance of the separation of the
"private" from the "public"-and the "citizen" from the "em-
ployee"-in excluding labor from the protection of the first amend-
ment. In the materials covered in the previous section, that
distinction is employed to insulate political life from economic life
and permit the denial of self-governance in the public employment
workplace. Here, while the public (constitutional) law embraces first
amendment values of freedom of conscience and expression, the pri-
vate (common) law regime gives this bundle of rights to the boss, and
deals labor out of the hand altogether.
III. A COMMON THREAD: THE PROBLEMATIC STATUS OF
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
It is no coincidence that the individuals in the cases we have con-
sidered thus far are each professional employees. In Connick, the dis-
charged public employee was an attorney; in Catholic Bishop, the
62 Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (whether state employee has sufficient
entitlement in job to trigger right to procedural due process in dismissal proceedings "must be
decided by reference to state law"); L. Tribe, supra note 6, § 10-10, at 694-701. On the under-
lying legal separation of ownership from employment, the "common law of labor relations," if
you will, see Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will
Employment Revisited, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 765, 794 (1985) (describing and criticizing the man-
ner in which various legal doctrines "maintain and enforce the separation of invested re-
sources' allocation, and exchange relations eliciting labor time").
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organizing rights at stake belonged to teachers; and, in Passaic Daily
News, the organizing rights belonged to a columnist. My point is that
the professional nature of the duties of these employees may also have
much to do with the way that the law treats them-again, not because
of first amendment concerns, but because of the law's assumptions
about labor.
In a series of doctrinal areas, Labor Act jurisprudence draws a
sharp distinction between the conception of work, which is under-
stood to be the prerogative of capital, and its execution, which is left
to labor.63 I offer two representative doctrinal examples. Take, first,
the treatment accorded managerial employees, who are excluded from
the Labor Act because of their participation in the formulation and
determination of management policy.64 Consider as well the rule that
an employer's decision to close a plant is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining-despite its evident impact upon "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" 65-because a plant closure de-
cision "involves a change in the scope and direction of the enter-
prise.'"66 Taken together, these doctrines reflect the principle that the
Labor Act will not intrude upon the employer's exclusive control over
the conception of work. Thus, if an employee participates in en-
trepreneurial policy-making, the Labor Act excludes him as a mana-
gerial employee. And if the employees' union attempts to bargain
about such policy-making, the Act removes the issue from the em-
ployer's bargaining obligation.
What does this all have to do with the treatment of labor in first
amendment jurisprudence? In each of the cases we have considered,
we were dealing with employees whose work, because of its profes-
sional nature, was deeply implicated in the conception of her em-
ployer's enterprise. In Catholic Bishop and Passaic Daily News,
nothing less was at stake than the employer's exclusive control over
what was to be taught in the parochial school classroom, or to be
printed in the press. Similarly, the very issue that triggered the dis-
pute in Connick was whether the district attorney or Sheila Myers
had the right to determine whether her transfer to another division of
63 On the importance of this distinction in American labor relations, see H. Braverman,
Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century 59-236
(1974); on its effect on labor law, see Fischl, Which Side Are You On? The Hierarchical and
Boundary Exclusions of Employees from the National Labor Relations Act (Oct. 2, 1988)
(unpublished manuscript available from the author).
64 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682-83 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 288 (1974).
65 See supra note 53.
66 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981).
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the criminal court would compromise the integrity of the public ser-
vice provided by the district attorney's office.6 7 In each case, we saw
that the result was to sacrifice first amendment values at the altar of
managerial control and employer authority. Again, then, the claim is
that these results are easier to understand for what they, reveal about
the law's treatment of labor than about the first amendment.68
CONCLUSION
I close with a favorite quote from Mason Williams, something I
think he said during the riots at the 1968 Democratic Convention in
Chicago: "I'd call the police, but they're already here." That is my
advice to those who are seeking a better lot for labor in first amend-
ment jurisprudence. They have "called" the Constitution, but it is
already here. And its current potential is, I am afraid, somewhat
bleak. The task then must be to struggle with our own conceptions of
labor, for it is these conceptions that imprison us-locking out the
rich emancipatory kernels of free expression, self-governance, and de-
mocracy embodied in our constitutional tradition.
67 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. Connick is not a sport case in this respect;
subsequent decisions have generally been less favorable to employees in policy-making posi-
tions than to the rank-and-file. Massaro, supra note 11, at 22 & n.97; see also Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (identifying extent of employee's authority and involvement
in policy-making as basis for diminished protection under Connick).
68 Cf. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (excluding full-time university faculty from protection of
Labor Act on basis of their policy-making function, notwithstanding their status as "profes-
sional employees," who are literally covered by the Act).
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